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 NOTE 
Last Rights Denied: Right of Sepulcher in 
Springing Power of Attorney for Health 
Care Invalidated 
In re Estate of Collins, 405 S.W.3d 602 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) 
ALICE HASELTINE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A cancer patient with deteriorating health prepares for her physical and 
mental decline by executing a durable power of attorney for health care.  The 
form grants the patient’s agent both the right to make health care decisions 
during the patient’s lifetime and the “right of sepulcher” – the authority to 
control the final disposition of the patient’s body.1  The powers in the form 
are “springing,” meaning the authority of the agent is ineffective until the 
patient is certified as having lost her mental capacity.2  The patient dies short-
ly thereafter in an accidental and instantaneous death.  Because the patient 
was not incapacitated prior to her death, the durable power remains ineffec-
tive, and the agent is refused the right to dispose of the patient’s body. While 
this result is unexpected, it reflects the current state of the law in Missouri.3 
A recent decision from the Missouri Court of Appeals, In re Estate of 
Collins, holds that when a competent principal under a durable power dies 
suddenly without the required doctor’s certification of incapacity, the agent’s 
right of sepulcher does not vest, and therefore, the agent is never granted au-
thority to dispose of the principal’s remains.4  The practical effect of this de-
cision is to invalidate the rights of sepulcher in prevalent springing durable 
powers of attorney for health care.  In light of this decision, all existing 
springing durable powers of attorney for health care in Missouri should be 
revisited to ensure that the instruments give effect to the principals’ intentions 
regarding the disposition of their remains.  Additionally, the Missouri legisla-
ture should enact legislation that will remedy durable powers of attorney for 
health care that were drafted prior to Collins. 
 
 * B.A., University of Virginia, 2012; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri, 2015; 
Senior Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2014-2015. 
 1. MO. REV. STAT. § 194.119.1 (2000). 
 2. MO. REV. STAT § 404.825 (2000). 
 3. See In re Estate of Collins, 405 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). 
 4. Id. 
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
On June 12, 2012, Betty Jean Collins executed a Durable Power of At-
torney for Health Care Choices and Heath Care Directive.5  Four short days 
later, Collins was involved in an automobile collision.6  She died instantane-
ously, and a legal battle over the disposition of Collins’ body ensued between 
her daughters, Robyne Ridley-McKinney and Charlotte Ridley, and her 
grandniece, Tina Shoemaker.7 
Collins’ durable power of attorney was stock – provided free by a local 
health clinic – and appointed Collins’ grandniece, Tina Shoemaker, “as [her] 
agent for health care choices when [she is] unable to make decisions or com-
municate her wishes.”8  The document provided, “This durable power of at-
torney becomes effective when two physicians certify that I am incapacitated 
and unable to make and communicate health care choices.”9  The document 
additionally explained, “You may choose to have one physician, instead of 
two, determine whether you are incapacitated.  If you wish to exercise this 
option . . . initial here.”10  Collins initialed the provision, indicating that a 
single physician’s certification would be sufficient to give effect to the docu-
ment’s provisions.11  When effective, this instrument afforded Collins’ agent 
certain powers to: 
- Consent, refuse or withdraw consent to artificially supplied nutrition 
and hydration. 
- Make all necessary arrangements for health care on [Collins’] behalf.  
This includes admitting [Collins] to any hospital, psychiatric treatment 
facility, hospice, nursing home or other health care facility. 
- Hire or fire health care personnel on [Collins’] behalf. 
- Request, receive and review [Collins’] medical and hospital records.  
Take legal action if necessary to do what [Collins] directed. 
- Carry out [Collins’] wishes regarding autopsy and organ donation, 
and decide what should be done with [her] body.12 
Upon Collins’ death, Shoemaker exercised the power of sepulcher that 
she believed was granted to her by Collins’ durable power of attorney and 
 
 5. Id. at 603. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 603 nn.1-2. 
 9. Id. at 603. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 604 (emphasis added). 
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made arrangements to have Collins’ body cremated.13  The Ridleys, who de-
sired to have their mother buried in a family burial plot, contested the action, 
filing a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, 
and Permanent Injunction to restrain Shoemaker from proceeding with cre-
mation.14  The Circuit Court of Benton County issued the temporary restrain-
ing order and heard arguments for preliminary and permanent injunctions.15 
The Ridleys argued that an injunction was proper because Shoemaker 
never had authority to act as Collins’ attorney in fact under the durable power 
of attorney.16  The Ridleys asserted that, because a physician did not certify 
Collins’ incapacity, the agent’s authority failed to take effect.17  In the ab-
sence of an attorney in fact, the Ridleys contended that they – as Collins’ 
daughters and closest kin – had the authority to determine the disposition of 
their mother’s body.18 
Shoemaker argued that she had the authority to decide the disposition of 
Collins’ body because a physician’s certification of incapacity was not re-
quired to give effect to the provision that allowed Collins’ agent to “decide 
what should be done with [her] body.”19  Shoemaker contended that an alter-
native interpretation of this provision would be contrary to statutory language 
that gives an attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney a priority to 
exercise the right of sepulcher on behalf of the principle.20  Further, Shoe-
maker presented testimony indicating that Collins desired to be cremated and 
that Collins executed the durable power of attorney to ensure that her burial 
preferences would be observed.21  Shoemaker argued that the court’s interpre-
tation of the document should effectuate these apparent intentions.22 
The trial court found the durable power of attorney effective and granted 
Shoemaker the right to Collins’ remains.23  The court did not elaborate on its 
reasoning; however, the court did observe from the bench, “[I]t does say the 
power of attorney becomes effective when two physicians certify . . . [that an 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 605. 
 19. Id. at 604. 
 20. Id.  The “statutory language” that Shoemaker uses as the basis of her argu-
ment is unspecified in the opinion.  Shoemaker is presumably referring to a Missouri 
Revised Statute that sets forth a hierarchal list of individuals entitled to exercise the 
right of sepulcher.  MO REV. STAT. § 194.119 (Supp. 2011).  At the top of the list is 
“[a]n attorney in fact designated in a durable power of attorney wherein the deceased 
specifically granted the right of sepulcher over his or her body to such an attorney in 
fact.”  Id. 
 21. Collins, 405 S.W.3d 602 at 606-07. 
 22. Id. at 607. 
 23. Id. at 603. 
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individual is] unable to communicate health care choices.  I’m kind of think-
ing the coroner saying ‘this person’s dead’ probably takes the place of that.”24 
The Ridleys filed an appeal in the Missouri Court of Appeals Western 
District.25  Upon review, the instant court held that if a durable power of at-
torney explicitly provides that the agent’s authority does not take effect until 
a physician conclusively determines incapacitation, and if the individual dies 
in a manner that is not preceded by a documented period of incapacity, the 
requisite condition precedent remains unsatisfied, and the agent’s authority 
under the durable power of attorney does not go into effect.26 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  A Property Right in the Human Body –  
The Historical Right of Sepulcher 
The right of sepulcher is “the right to choose and control the burial, 
cremation, or other final disposition of a human body.”27  While the modern 
right of sepulcher is narrowly defined and widely acknowledged, the history 
of this right reveals courts’ disagreement regarding the existence and scope of 
property rights in human remains.28 
As early as 1690, John Locke proposed that an individual holds a    
property right in his body.29  Yet, English common law declined to extend 
this concept to the recognition of property rights in human remains.30         
The idea that there could be a property right in human remains presented a 
procedural obstacle for the English court system: common law courts exer-
cised jurisdiction over property, while the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdic-
 
 24. Id. at 604 n.4 (quotation marks added). 
 25. Id. at 603. 
 26. Id. at 606. 
 27. MO. REV. STAT. § 194.119.1 (Supp. 2011). 
 28. Ann M. Murphy, Please Don’t Bury Me Down in that Cold Cold Ground: 
The Need for Uniform Laws on the Disposition of Human Remains, 15 ELDER L.J. 
381, 395 (2007). 
 29. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT 287 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge University Press (1960)).  John Locke writes, “Though the Earth and all inferi-
or Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. 
Thus no Body has any Right to but himself.”  Locke suggested that the body was 
property of a “special sort, held in trust rather than as an individual owner.”  Radhika 
Roa, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U.L. REV. 359, 367 (2000). 
 30. Roa, supra note 29 at 396; see, e.g., SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KNIGHT, 
THE LAW OF ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS 537 (Banks & Co., Albany, N.Y. 1899) 
(“[T]hough the heir has a property in the monuments and escutcheons of his ances-
tors, yet he has none in their bodies or ashes; nor can he bring any civil action against 
such as indecently at least, if not impiously, violate and disturb their remains when 
dead and buried.”). 
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tion over matters pertaining to the human body.31  The proposition that prop-
erty rights exist in human remains blurred the lines between two distinct pro-
cedural realms.32 
Reluctantly, American courts followed English precedent and declined 
to recognize a property right in human remains.33  A 1912 decision from 
West Virginia is representative of the early American aversion to the British 
no-property rule:34 
The real question is not the disposable, marketable value of a corpse 
or its remains, as an article of traffic, but it is of the sacred and inher-
ent right to its custody, in order to decently bury it and secure its un-
disturbed repose.  The dogma of the English ecclesiastical law, that a 
child has no such claim, no such exclusive power, no peculiar interest 
in the dead body of its parent, is so utterly inconsistent with every en-
lightened perception of personal right, so inexpressibly repulsive to 
every proper moral sense, that its adoption would be an eternal dis-
grace to American jurisprudence.35 
American courts’ desire to abandon the British no-property rule36 was 
magnified by the abandonment of the ecclesiastical courts in England37 and 
the need for statutes regulating the disposal of bodies and recognizing dam-
ages for the disfigurement of human remains.38  Despite disfavor for the Brit-
ish rule, American courts struggled to find a legal basis for the recognition of 
a property right in human remains.39  A uniform theory was not adopted.40  
Some jurisdictions allowed recovery for injuries arising from the mistreat-
ment of human remains through tort theory,41 and a second group of jurisdic-
tions redressed injuries through recognition of a quasi-property right in hu-
man remains.42 
Jurisdictions that permitted recovery in tort for the mistreatment of hu-
man remains recognized some combination of the following causes of action: 
 
 31. See Murphy, supra note 28. 
 32. See id. at 397-98. 
 33. Id. at 396; see, e.g., Snyder v. Snyder, 60 How. Pr. 368, 371 (N.Y. 1880) 
(“While there is property in the burial lot, in the monuments, in the ornaments and 
decorations of the deceased or his grave, there is none in the remains themselves.”). 
 34. Remigius N. Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the New Property Regime in 
Human Bodies and Body Parts, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 19, 31 (2002). 
 35. Ritter v. Couch, 76 S.E. 428, 430 (W. Va. 1912); Murphy, supra note        
28, at 398. 
 36. Murphy, supra note 28, at 398. 
 37. Id. at 397-98 
 38. Id. at 398. 
 39. See Nwabueze, supra note 34, at 28. 
 40. Id. at 30-31. 
 41. Rao, supra note 29, at 386. 
 42. Id. at 385-86. 
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intentional mishandling of a human corpse, abuse of a dead body, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 
negligent or wrongful interference with a dead body.43  While a plaintiff’s 
options for bringing an action against a corpse were seemingly numerous, so 
too were the courts’ restrictions on recovery.44  Some courts required that 
plaintiffs prove awareness of the defendant’s willful, wanton, and outrageous 
conduct.45  Other courts refused to allow plaintiffs to recover when the de-
fendant’s behavior was merely negligent.46  Recovery for mistreatment of 
human remains under tort liability was difficult and inconsistent.47 
Not every jurisdiction recognized the desecration of human remains as a 
cognizable injury within tort law, and strict application of the British no-
property rule left the spouse and next of kin of a desecrated corpse without a 
remedy.48  Courts needed a theory – or fiction – for granting a remedy to “in-
jured” relatives.49  The quasi-property theory resulted.50 
The concept of a quasi-property right is said to be “an invention by U.S. 
courts to help a deserving plaintiff.”51  A quasi-property right is – as its name 
suggests – a limited right with little relation to property in its traditional 
sense.52  A quasi-right in human remains affords the decedent’s spouse or 
next-of-kin the right to recover damages resulting from misconduct toward 
the decedent’s corpse but places two significant restrictions on the right of 
possession.53  First, the decedent’s spouse or next-of-kin is permitted to pos-
sess the body only for the purpose of proper burial.54  Second, designated 
survivors are required to possess the corpse in accordance with the decedent’s 
“manifest inter vivos intent.”55 
Missouri courts are of the group that recognized a quasi-property right 
in human remains.56  Early Missouri common law recognized a quasi-right in 
human remains; the “quasi” nature of this right is visible in Missouri courts’ 
 
 43. Nwabueze, supra note 34, at 29. 
 44. Id. at 30. 
 45. Id. at 31. 
 46. Id. at 29. 
 47. Id. at 29-30. 
 48. Id. at 30. 
 49. Id. at 30-31. 
 50. Id. at 31. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Ryan DeBoef, Another One Bites the Dust: Missouri Puts to Rest Uncertain-
ty About Anatomical Gift Immunity, 70 MO. L. REV. 837, 842-43 (2005). 
 54. Id. at 843. 
 55. Id. at 843-44. 
 56. Kimberly E. Naguit, Letting the Dead Bury the Dead: Missouri’s Right of 
Sepulcher Addresses the Modern Decedent’s Wishes, 75 MO. L. REV. 249, 251 
(2010). 
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treatment of recovery for damages to a corpse.57  The damages recoverable 
were not for injury to the dead body.58  Instead, because the next of kin held a 
mere quasi-property right in the decedent’s corpse, the next of kin could 
merely recover for emotional injuries – not for physical damage to the 
corpse.59  This restricted property right in human remains is referred to as the 
“right of sepulcher” and generally affords the decedent’s spouse or next-of-
kin the authority to dictate “the time, place, and manner of burial.”60  Today, 
all jurisdictions recognize this right to receive a body and make arrangements 
for its burial.61 
B.  Developments in Missouri Law 
In 2003, Missouri enacted its first right of sepulcher statute.62  This  
statute set forth a hierarchy under which individuals’ right of sepulcher    
vested: the surviving spouse was at the top of the list, followed by surviving 
adult children, parents, adult siblings, individuals in the next degree of kin-
ship, a person willing to assume the financial obligation, and, finally, the 
county coroner or medical examiner.63  The statute provided that a person 
could designate someone as “next-of-kin” by executing a signed, dated, veri-
fied, and witnessed document.64  The designated next-of-kin’s right would 
vest only in the absence of spouse, parents, children, or siblings.65 
Proponents of the 2003 law argued that the statute was necessary to clar-
ify an existing “gray area in Missouri law and provide . . . certainty for both 
 
 57. Patrick v. Emp’rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 118 S.W.2d 116, 122 (Mo. Ct.       
App. 1938). 
 58. Id. (quoting Hill v. Travelers Ins. Co. 294 S.W. 1097, 1099 (Tenn. 1927)). 
 59. Id. (quoting Hill, 294 S.W. at 1099) (“‘The damages recoverable . . . are . . . 
measured by the . . . suffering of the plaintiff . . . ‘”). 
 60. Murphy, supra note 28, at 396 (quoting Remigius N. Nwabueze, Biotechnol-
ogy and the New Property Regime in Human Bodies and Body Parts, 24 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 19, 31 (2002)). 
 61. While the right of sepulcher is universally recognized, the extent of the right 
varies by state.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-102 (West 2012); CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 7100.1 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-19-104 (West 2012); 
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 65/50 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-2-19-9 (West 
2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144C.5 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1734 (West 
2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.97501 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN § 149A.80 
(West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 194.119 (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-
1425 (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:27-22 (West 2012); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 
§ 4201 (McKinney 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.70 (West 2012); OKLA STAT. 
Ann. 21, § 1151 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-204 (West 2012); TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.02 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2825 (West 2012). 
 62. MO. REV. STAT. § 194.119 (Supp. 2011). 
 63. Id. § 194.119.2. 
 64. Id. § 194.118.8 
 65. Id. 
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families and funeral homes,”66 and supporters specifically voiced their con-
cern that funeral homes needed guidelines for giving deference to burial in-
structions when multiple parties claimed the right of sepulcher over a single 
body.67  While many viewed the hierarchal scheme set forth in the 2003 law 
as an improvement, the law failed to accommodate individuals whose desires 
were inconsistent with the statutory scheme.  This law proved particularly 
inadequate for lesbian and gay couples who preferred to afford their partners 
the right of sepulcher – rather than those related to them by consanguinity.68 
In 2008, the Missouri legislature amended Missouri Revised Statute sec-
tion 194.119.69  The revision reallocated power and placed “[a]n attorney in 
fact designated in a durable power of attorney wherein the deceased specifi-
cally granted the right of sepulcher over his or her body or to such an attorney 
in fact . . . .” at the top of the hierarchy.70  For the first time, a person unrelat-
ed by affinity or consanguinity could be granted the right of sepulcher despite 
the existence of the decedent’s spouse, parent’s children, or siblings.71  The 
implications of the change were felt beyond the gay community: the new law 
was beneficial to any individual whose sepulcher wishes conflicted with 
those of his family.72 
III.  THE INSTANT DECISION 
The threshold issue in Collins was whether a durable power of attorney 
that requires a physician’s certification of incapacity as a condition precedent 
to the effectiveness of the attorney in fact’s authority can spring into effect 
upon a corner’s certification of the individual’s death.73  The court held that it 
cannot and explained that when the explicit condition precedent is not satis-
 
 66. Summary of the Committee Version of the bill: H.B. 394 Designation of 
Next-of-Kin, 92d Gen Assem. (Mo. 2003) (House Comm. On the Judiciary), availa-
ble at http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills03/sumpdf/HB0394c.pdf. 
 67. Naguit, supra note 56, at 263-64. 
 68. See Kelly Wiese, New Missouri Law a Victory for Gay Rights, KAN. CITY 
DAILY REC. (Aug. 6, 2008), http://deathcarelaw.wp.lexblogs.com/wp-content/ up-
loads/sites/274/2014/02/Daily-Record-KC-aug-082.pdf. . 
 69. S.B. 1139, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008) (codified at MO. 
REV. STAT. 194.119 (Supp. 2008)). Governor Matt Blunt singed the bill on July 10.  
Naguit, supra note 56, at 264.  The new law became effective on August 28, 2008.  
MO. REV. STAT. §194.119.2 (Supp. 2008). 
 70. Id. at § 194.119.2. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Wiese, supra note 68.  Senator Justus, a Democrat from the tenth district, 
proposed the legislation.  Id. Commenting on the new law, Justus stated, “[n]o one 
saw [this] as [a lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender] issue.  They saw it as an end-
of-life issue.”  Id.; see also Naguit, supra note 56, at 264. 
 73. In re Estate of Collins, 405 S.W.3d 602, 603 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). 
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fied, the instrument fails to take effect.74  Collins died without her attorney in 
fact having the authority to act on her behalf.75 
The court’s analysis began with a fundamental explanation of the right 
of sepulcher.  Missouri Revised Statute section 194.119 defines the “right of 
sepulcher” as “the right to choose and control the burial, cremation, or other 
final disposition of a dead human body.”76  The provision further provides 
that “[t]he next-of-kin of the deceased shall be entitled to control the final 
disposition of the remains of any dead human being.”77  The court explained 
that the statute sets forth a hierarchical scheme for determining a decedent’s 
next-of-kin: at the top of the list is “[a]n attorney in fact designated in a dura-
ble power of attorney wherein the deceased specifically granted the right of 
sepulcher over his or her body to such attorney in fact.”78  Surviving children 
are lower in the hierarchy.79  The court explained that, based on the text of 
section 194.119, Shoemaker – if indeed an authorized attorney in fact under 
Collins’ durable power of attorney – was in the position of highest priority to 
determine the ultimate disposition of Collins’ body.80  Accordingly, the effec-
tiveness of the attorney in fact’s authority under Collins’ durable power of 
attorney was paramount to the court’s adjudication of each party’s rights.81 
In its analysis of Collins’ durable power of attorney, the court offered 
some explanatory groundwork: “A durable power of attorney is essentially 
one that does not terminate in the event the principal becomes disabled or 
incapacitated.”82  The court further explained that durable powers of attorney 
are authorized by the Durable Power of Attorney Law of Missouri (DPALM) 
and must comply with the provisions provided therein.83  Additionally, the 
court noted that Missouri has enacted the Durable Power of Attorney for 
Health Care Act (DPAHCA), which provides for the creation of durable 
powers of attorney that permit attorneys in fact to make general health care     
decisions on behalf of the principal.84  The court noted that there is significant 
overlap between the DPALM and the DPHCA, as section 404.810 of          
the DPHCA incorporates several DPALM provisions by reference.85  Most 
notably, the DPHCA incorporates section 404.710.6(8), which provides     
 
 74. Id. at 607. 
 75. Id. 
 76. MO REV. STAT. § 194.119.1 (Supp. 2012). 
 77. Id. § 194.119.3. 
 78. Collins, 405 S.W.3d at 605; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 194.119.2. 
 79. MO. REV. STAT. § 194.119.2(4). 
 80. Collins, 405 S.W.3d at 605. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 605 (citing MO REV. STAT. § 404.703(4) (2000)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. “Section 404.710, section 404.714, section 404.705, subsections 1 and 2 of 
section 404.707, section 404.717, subsection 1 and 2 of section 404.723, section 
404.727, and section 404.731 shall apply to powers granted under sections 404.800 to 
404.865.”  MO REV. STAT. § 404.810 (Supp. 2011). 
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that “[a]ny power of attorney may grant power of authority to an attorney in 
fact to . . . exercise the right of sepulcher over the principal’s body under 
section 194.119.”86 
The court established that the Durable Power of Attorney for Health 
Care Choices and Health Care Directive executed by Collins on June 12, 
2012 was drafted in accordance with the requirements set forth in the 
DPHCA.87  However, the court noted that a statutorily compliant, duly exe-
cuted durable power of attorney did not conclusively establish Shoemaker’s 
status as attorney in fact.88  The court explained, “[Section 404.714.8]89 pro-
vides . . . that ‘[a]n attorney in fact may be instructed in a power of attorney 
that the authority granted shall not be exercised until, or shall terminate on, 
the happening of a future event, condition or contingency, as determined in a 
manner prescribed in the instrument.”90  Collins’ durable power of attorney 
explicitly provided that it would only become effective when a physician 
certified Collins’ incapacity.91 
The court reasoned that Collins could have chosen to execute a power of 
attorney that granted the right of sepulcher to Shoemaker without a condition 
precedent.92  Relying on the durable power of attorney’s “clear, unambiguous 
language,” the court concluded that none of the provisions in Collins’ durable 
power of attorney came into effect because the condition precedent for the 
document was never satisfied.93  The court further explained that Shoemak-
er’s contention that the durable power of attorney should be interpreted in 
light of Collins’ intent and her desire to be cremated fails because such an 
interpretation would run afoul of the parol evidence rule.94 
In conclusion, the court reasoned, “A death certificate from a non-
physician coroner is simply not the same thing as a physician’s certification 
of incapacity.”95  Collins could have provided for a different condition prece-
dent – or omitted one entirely.96  Instead, she chose to execute a durable pow-
er of attorney that would only spring into effect under certain circumstanc-
es.97  Because the circumstances never materialized, Shoemaker never be-
 
 86. MO REV. STAT. § 404.710 (Supp. 2011). 
 87. Collins, 405 S.W.3d at 603. 
 88. Id. at 606. 
 89. This statute is found in the DPALM and is incorporated in the DPAHCA by 
reference.  See supra text accompanying note 85. 
 90. Collins, 405 S.W.3d at 606. 
 91. Id. at 603. 
 92. Id. at 606. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 606-07 (citing Blue Ridge Bank & Trust Co. v. American Ass’n of 
Orthodontics Foundation, 106 S.W.3d 543, 549 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003)) (“Absent 
ambiguity the intent of the maker of a legal instrument is to be ascertained from the 
four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence.”). 
 95. Id. at 607. 
 96. Id. at 606. 
 97. Id. 
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came Collins’ attorney in fact.98  Thus, the court held that the trial court erred 
as a matter of law when it concluded that Shoemaker was granted the right of 
sepulcher pursuant Collins’ durable power of attorney.99 
IV.  COMMENT 
The Collins decision creates a trap for the unwary.  The practical effect 
of Collins is to invalidate the rights of sepulcher in springing durable powers 
of attorney for health care prepared not only by attorneys but also those    
provided by organizations as a service to people across the state of Missouri.  
In practice, Collins creates an unexpected result: when a competent principal 
under a durable power of attorney dies suddenly without the required doctor’s 
certification, his or her agent’s right of sepulcher does not vest, and the   
agent is, thus, never granted authority to dispose of the principal’s remains.  
Collins’ unanticipated result does not, however, stem from an unprece-   
dented application of Missouri law.  Instead, the result is surprising because 
the drafters of the instrument executed in Collins did not consider the effect 
of a sudden death on the principal’s conveyance of the right of sepulcher.     
In light of Collins, legal practitioners and organizations that provide these 
forms and services should revisit all existing springing durable powers of 
attorney for health care to ensure that the instruments give effect to the prin-
cipals’ intentions regarding the final disposition of their remains.  Further 
still, the Missouri legislature should consider enacting legislation that will 
remedy durable powers of attorney that are drafted in disregard – or without 
knowledge – of Collins. 
A.  The Form at Issue 
The true significance of Collins is rooted in the universality of the lan-
guage the court declared ineffective.  The form executed by Collins ex-
plained, “This durable power of attorney becomes effective when two physi-
cians certify that I am incapacitated and unable to make and communicate 
health care choices.”100  This formulaic language is virtually indistinguishable 
from that found in the Missouri Bar’s Durable Power of Attorney For Health 
Care Choices & Health Care Directive, which provides, “This Durable Power 
of Attorney is effective when I am incapacitated and unable to make and 
communicate a health-care decision as certified by [a physician].”101  While 
exact statistics regarding the distribution of the Missouri Bar form are un-
 
 98. Id. at 607. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 603-04. 
 101. Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care & Health Care Directive, MO. 
BAR, http://www.mobar.org/uploadedFiles/Home/Publications/Legal_Resources/Dur-
able_Power_of_Attorney/final-dpa-forms-fillable.pdf at 1 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
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known, it is an undeniably prevalent form in Missouri.102  The Missouri Bar 
form’s popularity is likely attributable to its accessibility: a hyperlink on the 
Missouri Bar’s homepage connects patrons to a fillable form in which they 
are provided instructions for execution.103  The form’s instructions provide 
that formal legal counseling is not a requisite for execution.104  Because the 
condition precedent on the Missouri Bar form and the form provided to Col-
lins at the Warsaw Health Clinic105 are virtually indistinguishable, the court’s 
determination that a death certificate is not sufficient to conclusively establish 
incapacity106 does far more than invalidate Shoemaker’s authority to dispose 
of Collins’ body – it invalidates the prospective right of sepulcher granted to 
untold numbers of agents under the Missouri Bar’s Durable Power of Attor-
ney for Health Care and Health Care Directive.107 
The appellate court’s reasoning was based on Collins’ unrestricted abil-
ity to grant Shoemaker an immediate right of sepulcher and Collins’ decision 
to execute a form lacking this immediate authority.108  Technically, the 
court’s analysis does not deviate from the long established rule that durable 
powers of attorney be construed with “legal strictness” and that “[the] act 
[performed under the instrument] be legally identical [to the act] authorized 
to be done.”109  The court’s strict application of the rule to the facts of this 
case was painfully unyielding for those voicing Collins’ apparent intent to be 
cremated.  But it was, perhaps, most surprising to drafters and practitioners: 
 
 102. It is impossible to know how many Missouri Bar DPAHC forms have been 
executed.  Missouri Bar Media Relations Director, Farrah Fite, reported that the   
Missouri Bar has distributed more than 25,000 hard copies of the DPAHC since 
March 2012. 
 103. See http://www.mobar.org/ (click ‘Durable Power of Attorney’) (click ‘The 
Missouri Bar Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care and Health Care Directive’). 
 104. DPOAHC FAQ Sheet 1, available at http://www.mobar.org/uploadedFiles/ 
Home/Publications/Legal_Resources/Durable_Power_of_Attorney/final-dpa-forms-
fillable.pdf.  While the aid of a legal professional is not required, a document contain-
ing frequently asked questions can be downloaded with the fillable form that pro-
vides: “Please understand that the instructions and frequently asked questions con-
tained in the booklet, as well as the forms that you can consider completing, do not 
take the place of meeting with and receiving advice and counsel from an attorney-at-
law experienced in assisting clients with completing these forms.  Often lawyers who 
do estate planning, elder law, and general practice emphasizing those areas can assist 
you with your health care advance planning.  Please contact any of them if you have 
any questions.” 
 105. Collins, 405 S.W.3d 602, 607 n.1. 
 106. Id. at 606. 
 107. See supra note 101. 
 108. Collins, 405 S.W.3d at 606. The court explained that “Collins could have . . . 
executed a power of attorney granting the right of sepulcher to Shoemaker without the 
inclusion [of any] condition precedent . . . .  [yet] [t]he clear, unambiguous language 
of the durable power of attorney . . . expressly provides that none of its provisions 
become effective until . . . physician certification.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 109. Prior v. Hager, 440 S.W.2d 167, 174 (Mo. App. 1969). 
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the court’s disregard of the maxim ut res magis valeat quam – that the thing 
may rather have effect than be destroyed110 – was unforeseeable.  The court 
construed the durable power of attorney in a manner that gave no effect to the 
sepulcher provision.111 
The court’s wooden construction of Collins’ durable power of attorney 
was unexpected and raises unforeseen problems for practitioners and layper-
sons alike.  However, as this durable power of attorney – and those similarly 
constructed – returns to the drawing board, the rigidity of this decision pro-
vides certainty that precise revisions will be given effect.  The drafting goal 
of a stock durable power of attorney is not to “meet every person’s needs or 
contain every person’s choices,” and the Missouri Bar form is no excep-
tion.112  Instead, drafters strive to generate a form that is malleable enough to 
be workable for a variety of people.113  A durable power of attorney that is 
liberally interpreted is workable for no one because precise language is draft-
ed and executed in vain when there is no certainty that a court will give effect 
to the precision. 
B.  Implications Beyond the Right of Sepulcher 
While the most obvious effect of Collins is to invalidate an agent’s     
authority to determine the disposition of a principal’s body unless a physician 
certifies that the principal is incapacitated, the effect of Collins potentially 
extends beyond sepulcher.  Provisions relating to postmortem examination, 
autopsy, and authorization of anatomical gift giving114 are also at risk of  
invalidation under the existing form.  Like sepulcher, the relevance of powers 
relating to postmortem examination, autopsy, and anatomical gift giving      
do not hinge on the principal’s capacity or lack thereof.  While these particu-
lar issues were not contested in Collins, the court’s decision to draw a       
hard line between death and incapacity demonstrates the need for drafters to 
do the same. 
C.  Document and Statutory Amendments 
The necessary revision to the Missouri Bar form – and forms drafted in 
its likeness – is a simple one; there are two potential revisions that would 
better effectuate principals’ intent.  Drafters should consider modifying the 
existing form by distinguishing between powers that are exercised during the 
 
 110. Anglade v. St. Avit, 67 Mo. 434, 436 (1878). 
 111. Collins, 405 S.W.3d at 606. 
 112. DPOAHC FAQ Sheet, supra note 104, at 1. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Durable Power of Attorney for Healthcare and Healthcare Di-
rective, Section F, MO. BAR, http://www.mobar.org/uploadedFiles/Home/Publi-
cations/Legal_Resources/Durable_Power_of_Attorney/final-dpa-forms-fillable.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
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life of the principal after he is declared incapacitated and those powers that 
are exercised after death regardless of the principal’s capacity.115  It is diffi-
cult to imagine any circumstance under which a principal would desire for the 
right of sepulcher to vest only upon a certification of incapacity – rather than 
upon execution of the instrument.116  After all, the very nature of the right of 
sepulcher requires that the death of the principal precede the agent’s exercise 
of the right.  This revision better effectuates a principal’s intent because it 
affords principals the opportunity to grant their agent the right to make post-
humous decisions in the event of sudden, unexpected death. 
An alternative revision would alter the structure of the form and spatial-
ly separate powers exercised during the lifetime of the principal and those 
exercised after death.  Under a structure change, the rights of sepulcher, 
postmortem examination, autopsy, and authorization of anatomical gift giving 
would be addressed under a separate section on the form providing that “the 
provisions concerning the right of sepulcher, postmortem examination, autop-
sy, and authorization of anatomical gifts are effective immediately upon the 
execution of this instrument.”117  The effect of this structural change would 
be effectively identical to that of the language revision.118  The desired bene-
fit of a structure change would be heightened clarity; ideally, spatially sepa-
rating the right of sepulcher, postmortem examination, autopsy, and authori-
zation of anatomical gifts from rights relating to ante mortem capacity would 
make this distinction – and the rights’ immediate effectiveness – evident to 
the principal.119 
While a revision to the Missouri Bar form would likely minimize the 
occurrence of future situations where a principal wrongly believes that his 
durable power of attorney provides for the absolute disposition of his re-
mains, the court’s decision in Collins calls for further action.  The nature of 
the stock durable power of attorney – its modest execution requirements, 
current accessibility, and the fact that it is often provided by public service 
organizations potentially unapprised of changes in Missouri case law – has 
generated concern about whether a drafting revision is a sufficient remedy.120  
 
 115. The following is proposed language: “This durable power of attorney be-
comes effective when two physicians certify that I am incapacitated, except for the 
provisions concerning the right of sepulcher, postmortem examination, autopsy, and 
authorization of anatomical gifts, which are effective immediately upon the execution 
of this instrument.” 
 116. Of course, a principal who does not wish to grant his or her agent the right of 
sepulcher could indicate so on the form by declining to check the box granting the 
right of sepulcher under the instrument. 
 117. Language proposed by author. 
 118. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text. 
 120. Reg Turnbell, Recent Western District Case Calls for Action, MO. BAR 
ELDER LAW COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER, (Sept. 2013) http://www.mobar.org/com-
mittees/elderlaw/newsletter/sept13/wd.htm.  The need for legislative action does not 
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Members of the Missouri Bar Elder Law Committee have suggested that, in 
light of Collins, the Missouri legislature should consider enacting legislation 
that will “insulate against drafting errors.”121 
One legislative solution would be to amend Missouri’s Right of Sepul-
cher Statute found in Missouri Revised Statute section 194.119, which pro-
vides a hierarchy for determining where the right of sepulcher vests.122  The 
statute currently provides that at the top of the hierarchy is  “[a]n attorney in 
fact designated in a durable power of attorney wherein the deceased specifi-
cally granted the right of sepulcher over his or her body to such attorney in 
fact.”123  Additional language would be added to this portion of the statute to 
explain that such a designation in a durable power of attorney is immediately 
effective upon the execution of the power of attorney.124 
Whether the proposed legislation should apply retroactively is an addi-
tional consideration. While there is a fundamental principle of law holding 
that a retroactive law is generally unfair,125 there are several arguments favor-
ing a law with retroactive application, including the belief that the simultane-
ous operation of the new and old rules muddies – rather than clarifies – the 
state of the law.126  While the benefits of a retroactive revision to Missouri 
Revised Statute section 194.119 are apparent, retroactive legislation invokes 
constitutional considerations.127 
The Missouri Constitution places restrictions on the enactment of retro-
active legislation in article 3, section 13 which provides that “no . . . law ret-
rospective in its operation . . . can be enacted.”128  Legislation is retroactive 
 
express the majority opinion of the Missouri Bar Elder Law Committee.  Id.  Some 
members have articulated that drafting revisions are sufficient.  Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. MO. REV. STAT § 194.119 (2) (Supp. 2011). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Proposed revision to MO. REV. STAT § 194.119.2.1: 
For purposes of this chapter and chapters 193, 333, and 436, and in all cases 
relating to the custody, control, and disposition of deceased human remains, 
including the common law right of sepulcher, where not otherwise defined, 
the term “next-of-kin” means the following persons in the priority listed if 
such person is eighteen years of age or older, is mentally competent, and is 
willing to assume responsibility for the costs of disposition: 
(1) An attorney in fact designated in a durable power of attorney wherein 
the deceased specifically granted the right of sepulcher over his or her 
body to such attorney in fact. Such designation (in a durable power of at-
torney) is immediately effective upon the execution of said power of at-
torney; 
 125. Elmer Smead, Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of 
Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775, 777 (1936) (“Coke usually is cited as the au-
thority for this principle as represented by this maxim of the common law”).  Howev-
er, this rule can be traced from Greek and Roman law.  Id. at 775. 
 126. MCGOVERN, KURTZ, & ENGLISH, PRINCIPLES OF WILLS, ESTATES, & TRUSTS 
42 (2d ed. 2011). 
 127. See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text. 
 128. MO. CONST. art. 1, § 13. 
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“when it looks or acts backward from its effective date, and is retrospective if 
it has the same effect as to past transactions or considerations as to future 
ones . . . .”129  However, article 3, section 13 has not been interpreted as a 
strict prohibition on any law that relates to previous transactions; rather, this 
provision prohibits laws that affect previous transactions “to the substantial 
prejudice of the parties interested.”130  Rather than substantially prejudice the 
interested parties, this legislative action would put the law in conformity with 
what the law was thought to be.131 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Collins decision establishes that a dead person is not “incapacitat-
ed” for purposes of meeting a condition precedent on a durable power of at-
torney for health care.  The practical effect of this determination is to invali-
date the rights of sepulcher – and potentially rights relating to postmortem 
examination, autopsy, and authorization of anatomical gift giving – in spring-
ing durable powers of attorney for health care prepared by attorneys and or-
ganizations across the state of Missouri.  Drafters, practitioners, and those 
who have executed durable powers of attorney should revisit the documents 
to ensure that the instrument gives effect to the principals’ intentions regard-
ing the final disposition of their remains.  Further still, the Missouri legisla-
ture should consider enacting legislation to remedy durable powers of attor-
ney that were drafted without anticipating the problem caused by Collins. 
 
 
 129. Missouri Real Estate Com’n v. Rayford, 307 S.W.3d 686, 690 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2010) (quoting State ex rel. Meyer v. Cobb, 467 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Mo. 1971)).  
The determination as to whether retroactive legislation violates the Missouri Constitu-
tion hinges on “whether [the statute] . . . impairs a vested or substantial right or im-
poses a new obligation, duty, or disability with respect to a past transaction.”  Id. 
 130. Id.; see also American Eagle Waste Industries, LLC v. St. Louis County, 379 
S.W.3d 813, 827 (Mo. 2012). 
 131. A retroactive amendment would not be unprecedented in Missouri.  See, e.g., 
S.B. 892, 93d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006) (Uniform Trust Code section 
813 enacted in 2004 and made effective retroactively in 2006). 
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